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Abstract 
Despite the massive resources emanating from oil wealth, Nigeria has been unable to achieve 
long-term growth stabilisation, and the implications have been more injurious than ever imagined. 
The problems of bad leadership, wrong policy measures, among other contending issues, have 
been attributed to this growing menace.  This has led to critical thinking at virtually all level of 
social gatherings as to how the institutions can be best harnessed for macroeconomic stabilisation 
in Nigeria. In evaluating its objectives, this study employs the two-step Engle and Granger 
estimation procedure to analyse time-series data on price instability index and institutional quality 
index to account for the variations in macroeconomic instability as induced by institutional 
frameworks. Findings reveal that rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness and 
political stability and the absence of violence have a significant but negative relationship with 
macroeconomic instability in Nigeria in the short run. Based on findings from the study, the 
government should create an enabling environment for the society to engage its leadership 
challenges to be able to stamp out impediments that will deter its ability to stabilize its 
macroeconomic objectives. 
Keywords: Institutional Framework, Macroeconomic Stabilization, ECM, Nigeria. 
JEL Codes: C32, EO2 
1.0 Introduction 
The literature on growth outcomes as induced by the institutional quality has grown tremendously, 
but its relationship with macroeconomic instability remains a gap in extant literature. The 
consequences of sustained growth regimes remained unaccomplished in Nigeria. Equally, the 
underlying causal relationship that exists between institutional quality and macroeconomic 
instability remains grossly understudied in the extant literature, particularly Nigeria. 
Macroeconomic stability acts as a buffer against currency and interest fluctuations in the global 
market. It is a necessary, but insufficient requirement for growth. Efficient interaction between 
critical macroeconomic variables is needed for the growth regimes to be sustainable. Exposure to 
currency fluctuations, substantial debt burdens, unmanaged inflation and most importantly, 
institutional deficiency can cause economic crises at the detriment of the output of the nation. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Union (AU) and the World Bank, among others, place 
great emphasis on macroeconomic stability. Low and stable inflation indicates healthy demand in 
the marketplace; however, high or unstable inflation threatens growth. Stable institutional 
environments promote sustainable growth and development while unstable institutional 
environment cause panic and disharmonies growth processes and outcomes. There is 
overwhelming evidence that in the absence of macroeconomic stability, growth will be anaemic 
or, at best, volatile (The Global Competitiveness Report, 2017). 
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The consequences of corrupt institutions have left Nigerians walloping in intergenerational poverty 
which has led us to the brink of war. The height of this menace as evident in the fight against 
corruption by the President Muhammad Buhari led administration and quest to end terrorism in 
the North East has led to critical thinking with diverse researches and proposition been made about 
the short term and long-term implications of institutions mismanagement and macroeconomic 
instability in Nigeria.  
It has been established that strong institutions (the rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability 
and absence of violence, control of corruption, government effectiveness and voice and 
accountability) are the central indicators of macroeconomic stability across countries (World 
Governance Indicator WGI, 2015). Since macroeconomic instability refers to phenomena that 
make the domestic macroeconomic environment less predictable, it then becomes essential to 
closely monitor its evolutions because unpredictability hampers resource allocation decisions, 
investment, and growth process in the country. Questions are being asked as to which of these 
macroeconomic indicators drives one another. Could weak institutions drive macroeconomic 
instability through various leakages in the economy? Alternatively, could macroeconomic 
instability be responsible for weak institutions and vice-versa. The answers remain elusive. 
Nigeria, where the endemics of corruption, terrorism among many other leading societal problems, 
remains ambiguous, the role of institutions in attaining macroeconomic stability cannot be 
overemphasised. Without a well-defined institutional framework and also the channels of 
underlying causal relationships been adequately defined, macroeconomics stability seems 
unattainable. Siba (2008); Ali and Rehman (2015); Ifere, Okoi and Christian (2015) argued that 
the inability of Sub-Saharan Africa countries to attain the status of a developed nation is rooted in 
their institutional failures. Regardless of how sound macroeconomic policies are, its role in a 
society characterised by a weak institution will be trivial (Ifere, Okoi & Christian, 2015). It then 
becomes appropriate in contemporary ages to avail policymakers and the society at large a robust 
and comprehensive study that point to the effect of institutional led macroeconomic stability in 
Nigeria. 
It is against this background that this study proposes a framework that examines the roles of 
institutions towards achieving macroeconomic stability that the society desire. It also seeks to 
unravel the underlying causal structure that exists between institutional quality and indicators of 
macroeconomic instability in Nigeria. 
 
2.0 Literature review 
The literature on institutional quality and growth outcomes have grown tremendously but its 
impact on macroeconomic instability remains grossly understudied in Nigeria and beyond. This 
study attempts to narrow the deficiency in extant literature by offering timely research on the 
subject matter. An appraisal of recent study as shown chronologically; Zhuang, Dios and Lagman-
Martin (2010) appraised the role of governance and institutional quality. They highlighted the 
nexus among growth outcomes and disparities in income distribution in some of Asia developing 
regions. Findings reveal that developing Asian regions with strong institutional qualities like 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law scores over the global means 
(after controlling for per capita income) in 1998 grew faster on average during 1998-2008 (by 1.6, 
2.0, and 1.2 percentage points annually, respectively) than those economies scoring below the 
global means. Based on this, they argued that improving governance in these dimensions could be 
used as potential entry points of development strategies for many countries in the region.  
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Basu and Das (2010) used the Li-Racine (2004) generalised kernel estimation methodology to 
examine the relationship between institutions, based on data for 102 countries from 1980 to 2004. 
Their results indicated that the effect of institutional quality on development was heterogeneous 
across countries and concerning time. Their results also revealed that institutions had a positive 
impact on the level of development.  
Valeriani and Peluso (2011) also had similar results in their study. However, their findings also 
revealed that difference in the impact of institutional quality on developing and developed nations 
was with respect to the size of the impact, as opposed to its direction. Their results revealed that 
the number of veto players had a more significant impact on economic growth in developed 
countries, while higher civil liberties had a larger growth impact in developing countries.  
Haghighi, Sameti and Isfahani (2012) analyzed the effect of macroeconomic instability on the 
economic growth in Iran. They employed time-series data on macroeconomic instability and 
growth indicators from 1974 to 2008. Using Vector Error Correction Modeling techniques, they 
found that economic growth in Iran has an along-term relationship with the macroeconomic 
instability. In other words, changes in macroeconomic instability indicators will be associated with 
the increase (decrease) of economic growth in the long run.  
Bartlett, Cuckovic, Jurlin, Nojkovic and Popovski (2013) carried out a study to appraise the 
institutional reform-economic growth link in the neighbouring countries of the European Union. 
The findings of their study revealed that level of political stability, government accountability, 
degree of press freedom and effectiveness of efforts towards the reduction of the level of corruption 
are critical determinants of the macroeconomic effectiveness policies. 
Iyoboyi and Pedro (2014) analyzed the nexus between institutional capacity and macroeconomic 
performance using the VARtechnique. The results of the generalized impulse response function 
showed that one standard deviation innovation on institutional capacity reduced macroeconomic 
performance, while variance decomposition revealed that a substantial amount of the changes in 
macroeconomic performance in Nigeria macroeconomic performance is not due to changes in 
institutional capacity. 
Ali and Rehamn (2016) appraised the detriments of macroeconomic instability on the gross 
domestic product of Pakistan from 1980 to 2012. Using a constructed macroeconomic instability 
index consisting of the inflation rate, unemployment rate, trade deficit and budget deficit, they 
employ the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the VECM to account for short-
run and long-run dynamics of their models. They also adopt Granger causality to explain causal 
relationships inherent in the model. Findings reveal that macroeconomic instability has a deep-
rooted and detrimental impact on the gross domestic product of Pakistan. Hence, for achieving the 
desired level of gross domestic product, Pakistan should make macroeconomic environment stable. 
Olayungbo and Adediran (2017) examine the effects of oil revenue and institutional quality on 
growth outcomes in Nigeria. Time series data from 1984 to 2014 was analyzed using the ARDL 
model. Findings show the existence of long-run equilibrium among oil revenue, institutional 
quality, and economic growth. The short-run analysis indicates that institutional quality measured 
by corruption index promotes economic growth, while institutional quality retards economic 
growth in the long run. Also, oil revenue promotes economic growth in the short run and reduces 
it in the long run, thereby confirming the existence of the resource curse hypothesis in Nigeria. 
The impulse response analyses further support the ARDL results. They concluded that institutional 
quality is essential in explaining the relationship between oil revenue and economic growth in 
Nigeria.  
3.0 Methodology 
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3.1 Model Specification 
The study follows an endogenous growth model as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). The 
endogenous growth model is specified thus; 
   𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼       (1)  
  
Equation (1) shows a Cobb–Douglas function where 𝑌 represents the total production in an 
economy. 𝐴 represents total factor productivity, 𝐾 is capital, 𝐿 is labour, and the parameter 
measures the output elasticity of capital. For the particular case in which, the production function 
becomes linear in the capital and does not have the property of decreasing returns to scale in the 
capital stock, which would prevail for any other value of the capital intensity between 0 and 1. 
However, since our focus is on the institutional led growth, the model includes indices of 
institutional quality as factors that explain macroeconomic instability in Nigeria. This study is a 
prototype of Olayungbo and Adediran (2017). The functional relationship is specified thus; 𝑀𝐼 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊 , 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 , 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃 , 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹 , 𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶 , 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂) (2) 
 
Where 𝑀𝐼 represents macroeconomic instability proxied with price instability index (CPI), 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊 (the rule of law) which gives the perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence, 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 (regulatory quality) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃 (control of corruption) captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹(government effectiveness) 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies, 𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶(voice and 
accountability) captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂 (political stability and the absence of violence) measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
Restating the model in an econometric form: 𝑀𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3)     
   
 
Where 𝜀𝑡represents error term and 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4𝛽5𝑎𝑛𝑑𝛽6𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒.These 
variables are log-linearised to adjust for disparities in units and measurements 
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𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     
  (4) 
3.2 Data sources and measurements 
Our study used time series data for macroeconomic instability (measured with price instability 
index) and indicators for institutional quality in Nigeria (the rule of law, regulatory quality, control 
of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and the absence of violence, voice and 
accountability) from 1996 through 2015. The data are mainly obtained from the CBN statistical 
bulletin various issues up until 2015 and World Bank Database (WorldGovernance Indicator, 
2015).  
 
 
3.3 Estimation Technique 
In accounting for the short-run and long-run dynamics of institutional framework and 
macroeconomics instability in Nigeria, the study made use of a 3-prong econometric procedure. 
First, is the pre-estimation evaluation. These are the preliminary evaluation of the data using the 
descriptive statistics method in order to help show, describe and summarize the data in a 
meaningful way and also to know if the data are normally distributed through their averages and 
Jarque-Bera values (Gujarati and Dawn, 2009). Secondly, the Augmented Dickey-fuller (ADF) 
unit root tests were deployed to ascertain the order of integration of the variables. This test of the 
time series data is required because a non-stationary regressor invalidates many standard empirical 
results. The presence of a stochastic trend is determined by testing the presence of unit roots in 
time series data. Then, the Johansen co-integration test is applied to establish whether there is a 
long-run relationship between the variables will be performed. The primary step in the Johansen 
cointegration test is to obtain the optimal lag length because the Johansen cointegration test is 
sensitive to lag length. If the lag length is too much, the test will give a spurious result. The optimal 
lag length was determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) (Koehler and Murphree, 
1988). The Error Correction Model (ECM), a test for the short-run relationship between variables 
is then conducted to adjust for the short-run dynamics of the model. The Granger causality test 
was carried to determine the direction of causality that exists between the institutional framework 
and macroeconomic instability. The third phase is post estimation. In order to confirm the 
robustness and validity of the regression model, some post estimation tests were conducted. These 
are the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation to test for the presence of serial correlation, Breusch 
Pagan Heteroscedasticity to test for heteroskedasticity and Cusum stability test to test the structural 
stability of the model. 
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4.0 Result and Interpretations 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data Set 
 𝒍𝒏𝑴𝑰 𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑼𝑳𝑬𝑳𝑨𝑾 𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑸𝑼𝑨 𝒍𝒏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑷 𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑻𝑬𝑭𝑭 𝒍𝒏𝑽𝑶𝑰𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕 𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑩𝑽𝑰𝑶𝒕
 Mean  6.435040  5.861527  8.058416  6.064924 6.005985 5.642822 3.58227
3 
 Median  7.028379  5.554199  8.340277  6.740165 7.232390 6.135136 5.81464
2 
 Maximum  9.633174  9.343824  11.45259  9.312545 14.72658 12.90268 15.2212
8 
 Minimum  2.014903  3.456632  4.546799  1.791759 3.257319 4.007931 2.44273
8 
 Std. Dev.  2.655374  1.575209  2.285007  2.567785 1.313406 0.992423 1.35404
6 
 Skewness 0.407074  0.323187 0.137135 0.362894 1.078180 -0.249117 0.76162
2 
 Kurtosis  1.756841  2.254129  1.731731  1.718485 2.541244 2.362006 1.98365
8 
 Jarque-
Bera 
 3.220411  1.420597  2.455442  3.163197 6.277947 0.846396 4.33124
7 
 Probability  0.199847  0.491498  0.292960  0.205646 0.143327 0.654949 0.11467
8 
Source: Authors computation (E-views), 2017  
Table 1 shows the mean and median of all the observations in the data set lie within the maximum 
and minimum values indicating a high tendency of normal distribution. All the variables are 
positively skewed. The kurtosis statistics show that all the variables were platykurtic, suggesting 
that their distributions were flat relative to normal. The Jarque-Bera statistics shows that the series 
is normally distributed since the p-values of all the series are not statistically significant at 5% 
level. Thus, informing the acceptance of the null hypothesis that says each variable is normally 
distributed. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Data Set 
  MAC_INST RULE_LAW REG_QUA 
CONT_CO
R GOVT EFF VOI_ACC 
POL 
STAB 
MAC_INST 1    
   
RULE_LAW -0.801822 1   
   
REG_QUA -0.841476 -0.820874 1  
   
CONT_CORR 0.538657 0.471148 0.844117 1 
   
GOVT_EFF 0.741235 0.112225 0.512355 0.546622 1  
 
VOI_ACC 0.894521 0.845121 0.756231 0.852223 0.562222 1 
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POL_STAB 0.412455 0.742551 0.654213 0.456622 0.785442 0.765522 1 
 
Source: Authors computation, 2017 
Furthermore, studies have argued that testing of the correlation among the variables of estimates 
would make the researchers detect whether the variables have high multicollinearity among 
themselves. As a result, the parameter estimates may contradict what the theory says due to 
unexpected effect of multicollinearity among the independent variables Hamsal, (2006); Agung, 
(2009); Oseni (2016). However, Iyoha (2004) argued that multicollinearity among variables occur 
when the result of the correlation coefficient is above 0.95.  
In line with this explanation, the study presents the results of the correlation analysis of the set of 
variables employed in Table 2 above. The table shows that the correlation coefficients among the 
variables are below 0.95, indicating that there is no tendency for multicollinearity to occur among 
the independent variables. 
 
4.2 Time Series Properties of the Variables 
The ADF test is used to test for stationarity of the data. The ADF test consists of estimating the 
following regression. ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽t + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡𝑚𝑖=1        (5) 
Where 𝛼 represents the drift, t represents deterministic trend and m is an optimal lag length 
ample enough to ensure that 𝜀𝑡 is a white noise error term. 
Table:3 Unit Root Test: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) 
Variables 
 
Level 
T-Stat 
Critical Value @ 
5% 
First 
Difference 
T-Stat 
Critical Value @ 
5% 
Order of 
Integration 
𝒍𝒏𝑴𝑰 -1.304641 -2.485522 -4.898565 -2.971853 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑼𝑳𝑬𝑳𝑨𝑾 -1.026062 -2.855222 -5.592401 -2.879542 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀 -1.552906 -2.963972 -7.220743 -2.777895 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑷 -1.237807 -2.785662 -5.784555 -1.945778 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑻𝑬𝑭𝑭 -1.542010 -2.702211 -7.655221 -4.555627 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑻𝑬𝑭𝑭 -1.487529 -2.632455 -6.782222 -2.222344 I(1) 𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑩𝑽𝑰𝑶 -1.793222 -2.789994 -3.654122 -0.782244 I(1) 
Source: Authors computation (E-views), 2017 
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The study used Augmented Dickey-Fuller to ascertain the order of integration of the variables. It 
is observed that all the variables are stationary at first difference at 5% significance level.The 
appropriate modus operandi of analysis that captures the combination of I(1) stationary variables, 
according to Johansen (1999) is the ECM technique. The primary form of the ECM model is given 
as: Δ𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽2Δ𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽3Δ𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑡 +𝛽4Δ𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5Δ𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑡 + 𝛽6Δ𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝐸𝐶𝑀 + 𝜀𝑡  (6) 
 
Where Δ is the first difference operator while other variables remain as defined earlier. The Error 
Correction Mechanism will indeed tell how much deviation from the long run is being corrected 
in the short run. In order words, it gives the speed of adjustment from long-run equilibrium to the 
short run. 
 
4.3 Optimal Lag Length Selection 
The implication of the lag length selected explains the effect of the outcome of the previous year 
on the current year. The selection of an optimal lag length was essential before carrying out a 
Johansen co-integration test, the result of which is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Optimal Lag Length Selection Criteria  
Lag length LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -130.3963 NA   0.000123  8.023310  8.292668  8.115169 
1  64.80295 310.0223*  1.09e-08*  -1.341350*  0.544154* -0.698339* 
Source: Authors computation (E-views), 2017 
Notes * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final Prediction Error  
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion  
 SC: Schwarz Information Criterion  
 HQ: -Hannan- Quinn Information Criterion 
The result in Table 4 portrays different lag length criterion (LR, FPE, AIC, SC and HQ). The 
Schwarz information criteria depicting lag order length of (1) for the model is selected. After 
establishing the lag order length, the co-integration, and long-run equation results was estimated 
and explained in the next section. 
 
4.4 Co-Integration Test 
Johansen Co-Integration Test 
The result of the Johansen Co-integration for both the Trace Statistic and Maximum Eigen Value 
is reported in Table 5. With the hypothesized level of acceptance is 5 percent, 
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Table 5: Result of Johansen Co-integration test based on Trace Statistic and Max  Eigenvalue 
  Trace Statistic Max. Eigen Value 
No. of CE(s) Eigenv
alue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0,05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. Max-
Eigen 
Value  
Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None * 0.74 138.42 95.75 0.00 44.52 40.10 0.01 
At most 1 * 0.69 93.91 69.82 0.00 38.61 33.88 0.01 
At most 2* 0.53 55.29 47.86 0.01 25.50 27.58 0.09 
At most 3* 0.42 29.80 29.80 0.05 18.17 21.13 0.12 
At most 4 0.21 11.63 15.50 0.18 7.86 14.26 0.39 
At most 5 0.11 3.76 3.84 0.05 3.76     3.84 0.05 
Source: Authors computation (E-views), 2017 
Notes: Trace test indicates 4 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
The result simply means that there is a long-run relationship between the regressed and the 
regressorsbased on the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. The 
determination of the short run association is computed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Error Correction Model  
Table 6: Short - run Estimation 
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Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.144023 0.043916 3.279479 0.0029*** 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑼𝑳𝑬𝑳𝑨𝑾) -0.119305 0.066871 -1.784115 0.0331** 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀) -0.176324 0.072101 -2.445524 0.1913 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑷) -0.451744 0.101465 -4.452222 0.0294** 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑶𝑽𝑻𝑬𝑭𝑭) -0.874411 0.225389 -3.879562 0.0475** 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑽𝑶𝑰𝑨𝑪𝑪)) 0.695522 1.232559 0.564291 0.1494 𝜕(𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑩𝑽𝑰𝑶) -0.755222 0.150915 -5.004291 0.0129** 
ECM(-1) -0.459100 0.129109 -3.555899 0.0014*** 
R-squared 0.716278 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.653229 
F-statistic 11.36061 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003* 
 Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.887587 
Source: Authors computation (E-views), 2017 
*(1%)**(5%) ***(10%)respectively 
 
Table 6 represents the result of short-run estimates by using the Error Correction Model (ECM). 
The estimated coefficient of the error correction vector is 0.4591. This means that the error 
correction term ECM(-1) is the speed of adjustment correcting back at the rate of 45.91 per cent 
annually. The negative sign and the significant probability signify the existence of co-integration 
among the variables. This shows that approximately 46% of the previous year's disequilibrium in 
the economy is corrected in the short run which implies that adjustment of the deviation of the 
explanatory variable back to normality is very high. The result of the short run in Table 6 indicates 
that rule of law, control of corruption; government effectiveness and political stability and absence 
of violence have a negative but significant relationship with macroeconomic instability in the short 
run. The Durbin Watson value of1.88 indicates no serial autocorrelation among the explanatory 
variables in the model. The F-statistics of 11.36061 is statistically significant at 1 per cent level, 
indicating that the explanatory variables are jointly significant.  
 
11 
 
4.6 Granger Causality Test 
To model the direction of causality that exist between institutional framework and macroeconomic 
stability in Nigeria, the functional relationship is specified below; 
 
= =
−− ++=
m
i
n
j
tjtjitit INSTMIMI
1 1
1       (7) 
 
= =
−− ++=
m
i
n
j
tjtjitit INSTMIINST
1 1
2       (8)  
Where INST (institutional framework) is an index of governance and MI  is macroeconomic 
instability. 𝜀1𝑡and𝜀2𝑡 are the disturbances which are assumed to be orthogonal. In this framework, 
there are four possible hypotheses. 
Case 1: Unidirectional causality from MI to INST . This is indicated if  i 0 and j =0   
Case 2: Unidirectional causality from INST to MI . This is indicated if i =0 and  j 0.  
Case 3: Bilateral causality. This is indicated if  i 0 and  j 0.  
Case 4: No causality. This is indicated if i =0 and j =0. 
 
Table 7: Granger Causality Test Result 
 Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  Granger Causality 
 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  2.15914 0.3433 No Causality 
 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑊  0.00341 0.4139 
     
 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  0.44726 0.5093 No Causality 
 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌  2.94988 0.0973 
     
 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  0.44726 0.0093 Unidirectional Causality  𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃→ 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃  2.94988 0.0973 
     
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  0.44726 0.5093 No Causality 
 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹  2.94988 0.0973 
     
 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  0.44726 0.5093 
12 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶  2.94988 0.0973 No Causality 
     
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼  0.44726 0.5093 No Causality 
 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼 does not Granger Cause 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑉𝐼𝑂  2.94988 0.0973 
     Source: Authors’ computation (E-views), 2017 
 
Result from the granger causality test was shown in Table 7. It reveals that unidirectional causality 
from control of corruption to macroeconomic instability in Nigeria. Invariably, the ability of 
successive government of the federation to control inflation will ensure the nation moves closer to 
attaining macroeconomic stability and vice-versa. 
 
Table 8: Serial Correlation Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.845890     Prob. F(3,25) 0.4433 
Obs*R-squared 2.236642     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.3268 
     
     Source: Authors’ computation (E-views), 2017 
Given the probability value of 32.68 percent, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
our short run model is free from serial correlation. 
  
Table 9: Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Source: Authors’ computation (E-views), 2017 
 
The p-value (0.3334) of Obs* R-squared showed that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This 
implies that residuals have a constant variance which is desirable. That is, residuals are 
homoskedastic. 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     F-statistic 3.029755     Prob. F(6,27) 0.0214 
Obs*R-squared 13.68061     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.3334 
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Fig.1: CUSUM Stability Test 
Source: Authors’ computation (E-views), 2017. 
The above figure shows that the CUSUM line is within the critical bounds of 5 percent level of 
significance which indicates that the model has structural stability. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
The study investigates macroeconomic instability as induced by institutional frameworks in 
Nigeria from 1996 to 2015 (19 years). In evaluating its objectives, the paper adopts Error 
Correction Modeling techniques to account for the dynamics of the model and also prevent the 
variables from converging to their long-run characteristics by gradually adjusting it back to their 
short-run equilibrium positions. The empirical result indicates that rule of law, control of 
corruption; government effectiveness and political stability and absence of violence have a 
negative but significant relationship with macroeconomic instability in the short run. The findings 
of the study align with the findings of Zhuang, Dios, and Lagman-Martin (2010); Ali and Rehamn 
(2016); Olayungbo and Adediran (2017) who found a linear relationship between institutional 
framework and macroeconomic instability. It is therefore recommended that the society should do 
more to embrace strong institutions that will promote inclusiveness and their instrumental value 
as a means of toward better growth performance and equal income distribution. 
 
Acknowledgement 
Special thanks to Mumeen Olatubosun ALABI, Ifeoluwa Blessing TAIWO and Tawakalit 
Omolara OWOYENI for their valuable contributions. 
References 
AgungI.N.(2009).Time series data analysis using E-view. Clementi Loop, Singapore: John Wiley 
& Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd. 
14 
 
Ali A.&Rehman H. U (2015). Macroeconomic Instability and ItsImpact on Gross Domestic 
Product: AnEmpirical Analysis of Pakistan. MPRA Paper No. 71037, posted 1 May 2016 
22:39 UTC 
Bartlett, W., Cuckovic, N., Jurlin, K., Nojkovic, A., &Popovski, V. (2013). Institutional quality 
and growth in EU neighbourhood countries. Search Working Paper, 5/11. 
Basu, S. R. & Das, M. (2010). Institution and development revisited: A nonparametric approach. 
Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities. Study Series, No. 42, United 
Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
Gujarati, D. N. and Dawn. C. P. (2009). Basic Econometric (5th Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill 
Haghighi H.K., Sameti M.&Isfahani R.D (2012). The Effect of Macroeconomic Instability on 
Economic Growth in Iran. Research in Applied Economics4(3), 15-24. 
Hamsal, M.(2006).The effect of paradoxical strategies on firm performance :an empirical study of 
Indonesian banking industry. Dissertation, Graduate School of Management, Faculty of 
Economics, University of Indonesian. 
Ifere, E. O., Okoi, O. B.& Christian E. B. (2015). Institutional Quality, Macroeconomic Policy and 
Economic Development in Nigeria.Journal of Economics and Development Studies3(2), 
140-145 
Iyoboyi, M. & Pedro, L. M. (2014). Institutional capacity and macroeconomic performance: 
empirical evidence fromNigeria. Research in Applied Economics, 6(1), 38-60.  
IyohaM.A.(2004). Applied econometrics (Second Edition).Benin City,Nigeria:MindexPublishing 
Koehler &Murphree (1988). A comparison of Schwarz and Akaike Criteria for selecting model 
order. Journal of royal statistic society series, 37, 187-195 
Olayungbo D.O. &Adediran K.A. (2017). Effects of Oil Revenue and Institutional Quality 
onEconomic Growth with an ARDL Approach. Energy and Policy Research, 4(1), 44-54. 
Oseni I. O. (2016). Exchange rate volatility and private consumption in Sub-Saharan African 
countries:A system-GMM dynamic panel analysis. Future Business Journal (Elselvier) 2, 
103–115 
Siba, E. G. (2008). Determinants of institutional quality in sub-Saharan African 
countries.Working Papers inEconomics, No 310, School Of Business, Economics and 
Law, University of Gothenburg. 
Valeriani, E. &Peluso, S. (2011). The impact of institutional quality on economic growth and 
development: Anempirical study. Journal of Knowledge Management, Economics and 
Information Technology, Issue 6.Retrieved from http://www.scientificpapers.org 
02/01/2018 
Zhuang J., Dios E., and Lagman-Martin A (2010)Governance and Institutional Quality and the 
Links with Economic Growth and Income Inequality: With Special Reference to 
Developing Asia. ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 193 
 
 
